

Being Prey:

Dismantling the Emplacement/Displacement Dualism

ABSTRACT

Emplacement and displacement can be presented as experiences that lie in direct opposition to each other. To experience emplacement is to be immersed within the rich nuances of a place; it is to embody some kind of authentic existence that sees the self and the place inhabited as deeply aligned. The experience of displacement is to feel oneself as so disconnected from the intricacies of a place as to assume that such intricacies are non-existent; the self is unable to find a home within a place as the place is experienced as devoid of meaning and significance. In this paper I challenge this dualistic account of emplacement and displacement using Val Plumwood's observations pertaining to dualisms and dismantling dualisms. I explore Plumwood's account of 'Being Prey' as an example of how a non-dualistic understanding of 'placement' may emerge.

INTRODUCTION

The characteristics and consequences of being emplaced and of being displaced are recurrent themes in place discourse and in some branches of environmental ethics. How one experiences or identifies oneself in relation to a place or a suite of places, and perhaps how one should identify oneself, provides an ontological backbone for much place literature. This includes manifestations of displacement and emplacement as distinct experiences that lie in direct opposition to each other; they form a "simple but basic dualism" (Relph, 1976: 49). As Geographer Edward Relph describes, existential outsidership – the most extreme experience of displacement – involves:

A self-conscious and reflective uninvolvedness, an alienation from people and places, homelessness, a sense of the unreality of the world, and of not belonging. From such a perspective places cannot be significant centres of existence, but are at best backgrounds to activities that are without sense, mere chimeras, and at worst are voids (Relph, 1976: 51).

Such experiences of displacement receive most graphic representation in the Fall from Grace; a fall out of place and an associated loss of self and agency. For example, deep ecology proponent George Sessions writes:

Most people are like the slaves in Plato's cave; they have mostly opinion about casual sequences in Nature in that their perceptions and thoughts are colored by their ego desires. They are essentially helpless and passive, moved by emotions, fears, and desires based on ignorance and imagination, and living life largely by reacting to external causes and situations (Sessions, 1985: 239).

At the other pole Relph positions existential insidership – the most profound experience of emplacement, in which a place is experienced without deliberate and self-conscious reflection yet is full of significances. It is the insidership that most people experience

when they are at home and in their own town or region, when they know the place and its people and are known and accepted there (Relph, 1976: 55).

To experience emplacement is to be immersed within the rich nuances of a place; it is to embody some kind of authentic existence that sees the self and the place inhabited as deeply aligned. At the very least it is assumed that if emplaced, life, both for the individual and for the human and more-than-human communities, will be better. As place writer John Cameron observes:

Sustainability includes sustaining a sense of place, being moved and moving others through a love of the particular – the way a late-afternoon shaft of light illuminates a bough of white azaleas, the way the wind carves ovoid hollows beneath the iron-enriched skin of the Hawkesbury sandstone (Cameron, 2003: 37).

In this paper I challenge such polarised, dualistic experiential descriptions of emplacement and displacement, arguing that they provide neither an accurate nor adequate ontological basis for approaching the complexities and multiplicities of self and of the self in relation to place. I draw on the work of pre-eminent philosopher and ecofeminist Val Plumwood, particularly her observations pertaining to dualisms and dismantling dualisms (1991; 1993). I begin by outlining the characteristics of the emplacement/displacement dualism including the characteristics ascribed to each pole, and discuss what dismantling this dualism may and may not involve. I then explore Plumwood's (1996)ⁱ account of her crocodile attack in Kakadu, northern Australia as an example of how a non-dualistic understanding of 'placement' may emerge. I conclude by proposing Relph's interconnected notions of insideness and outsideness as a starting point from which to account for the fluxing complexity and multiplicity of self within place. I highlight that while Relph identifies his understanding of insideness and outsideness as a 'dualism', he describes it as having spectral qualities – where there is movement between seven manifestations of outsideness and insideness (Relph, 1976: 49-50).

EMPLACEMENT/DISPLACEMENT

Plumwood (2008) argues that much ecological thought has focused on the goal of being self-sufficient within small, atomistic communities, while disregarding the multiplicity and complexity of the network of places that support these communities. She argues that "ecological thought has to be much more than a literary rhapsody about nice places, or about nice times (epiphanies) in nice places" (Plumwood, 2008: 139). It must also take into account the *shadow places* – those 'out of sight, out of mind' places that support where and how we live and are essential, even, in our envisioning of more idealised home places.

While not speaking directly of an emplacement/displacement dualism, Plumwood's account of a singular homeplace spilt from our networked and global ecological footprint, lies in direct relation to such a dualism and emphasises the interrelationship between coexistent dualisms. She argues:

The dissociation of the affective place (the place of and in mind, attachment and identification, political effectiveness, family history, ancestral place) from the economic place that is such a feature of the global market is yet another manifestation of the mind/body dualism that has shaped western tradition... Contemporary market-based practices that effect a dissociation between affective/identity places and places of production reduce and fragment place, stripping it of meaning (Plumwood, 2008: 141).

Without an adequate critique of dualistic frameworks, aspects of place discourse and environmental ethics unwittingly take on board and reinforce these structures. Home places and shadow places represent not poles of a geographical dualism – a split between what is here and what is thereⁱⁱ – they also have ontological dimensions. What it means and how it is to exist in homeplaces and shadow places also falls within a dualistic structure, a structure that is definable though the notions of emplacement and displacement and the interrelationships these hold with other dualisms such as wild/built, mind/body and self/other.

Plumwood (1991; 1993) identifies five features that define a dualism:

1. Backgrounding (denial)

Backgrounding is the “refusal of dualism to recognise that the devalued term of a disjunctive pair contributes in any important way to the privileged term” (Diehm 2003: 33). It is a denial of the mutually constitutive relationship between the pair. In terms of emplacement/displacement there is no recognition that the experience of emplacement relies significantly upon and is interrelated with the experience of displacement; the contribution that experiences of displacement make to experiences of emplacement is denied. Descriptive accounts of sense of place frequently exclude mention of unsettling experiences such as pest infestations, violence, illness, grief and the perceived mundane nature of housework. They tend to focus entirely on experiences of emplacement such as feelings of attunement and attachment, socialisation with like-minded people, passive encounters with friendly (native) species and emersion within rewarding artist endeavours. The contribution of the experience of displacement is backgrounded or denied through non-reference, despite such experiences being common features of day-to-day life.

For example, in descriptions of his sense of place John Cameron describes his personal journey in dwelling as “bringing into conscious awareness how I dwell, and how place sustains and shapes my existence” (2003: 36). However, Cameron’s accounts of emplacement, both in the Blue Mountains west of Sydney (2003) and on Bruny Island in southern Tasmania (2008a; 2008b; 2009) make no reference to the intensive and repetitive work of maintaining a home through housework, even though such work must be an inherent part of how place sustains and shapes Cameron’s existence wherever he is dwelling. Such work, and the experiences of displacement so often associated with it, are backgrounded and in effect denied in his descriptions of emplacement.

2. Radical exclusion (hyperseparation)

Radical exclusion is dualism's attempt to magnify the differences between disjuncts, which promotes a view of them as different not merely in degree but in kind" (Diehm 2003: 33). The hyperseparation of emplacement and displacement enforces the ideas that there are two unique types of experience of place and self within place.

On one hand the experience of emplacement is characterised by a sense of wholeness, contentment, commitment, deep knowledge, mindfulness, capacity for deep rational thought, and the capacity for care and consideration of others. This experience is understood to be rich and nuanced, as illustrated in Paul Shepard's account of Aboriginal Australia:ⁱⁱⁱ

In going on the pilgrimage called walkabout, the Aborigine travels to a succession of named places, each familiar from childhood and each the place of some episode in the story of creation. The sacred qualities of each are heightened by symbolic art forms and religious relics. The journey is into the interior in every sense, as myth is the dramatic externalization of the events of an inner history. To the pilgrims these places are profoundly moving. The landscape is a kind of archive where the individual moves simultaneously through his personal and tribal past, renewing contact with crucial points, a journey into time and space refreshing the meaning of his own being (Shepard, 1977: 31).

The experience of displacement, on the other hand, is held to have nothing in common with emplacement, and is characterised by shallow knowledge, insatiability, fickleness, fear, anxiety and a lack of awareness of any these characteristics and the fact that they are 'a problem.' In experiencing oneself as emplaced one is a master of oneself, whereas in the experience of displacement one is a slave to others. As previously cited deep ecologist George Sessions describes, with reference to Plato's cave, 'most people' as helpless, passive, ignorant and reactionary (Sessions, 1985: 239):^{iv}

A significant consequence of this hyperseparation is that it is assumed that the displacement of others is a consequence of the machinations of beings experiencing displacement. As no overlap between the two poles is perceived, the experience of emplacement can in no way be involved with or implicated in generating experiences of displacement.

3. Incorporation (relational definition)

Incorporation is "the manner in which the characteristics associated with one side of the dualism are taken as primary, and the other is defined in terms of its lack of these qualities" (Diehm 2003: 33). As exemplified above (Sessions, 1985; Shepard, 1977), it is what the experience of displacement lacks in relation to the experience of emplacement that is used to define its characteristics.

It is assumed, within a dualistic framework, that transformation from the experience of displacement into that of emplacement is possible, but only through incorporation. To experience emplacement is to attain the characteristics of emplacement and disregard and discard those associated with the experience of displacement. There is nothing that the experience of displacement has to offer which is

primary. As Bill Devall states: “Outside the ordered, bordered, fenced, domesticated, patrolled, controlled areas of our region, our wild self is waiting” (Devall, 1988: 70-1).

4. Instrumentalisation (objectification)

Instrumentalisation “sees those associated with the inferiorized pole of the dualism as having meaning, purpose or function solely in relation to those which are privileged, treating the ends, goals, or activities of the former as instruments to the activities of the latter” (Diehm 2003: 33). The experience of displacement does not have ends of its own – it is part of the indefinite Fall from Grace, serving only as a foil for the need of emplacement.

5. Homogenisation or stereotyping

Homogenisation involves “minimising differences among those associated with the devalued class of terms” (Diehm 2003: 33). The experience of displacement is a singular experience – there is no nuanced complexity within this experience and no differentiation can be made between multiple experiences of displacement. Examples of this include Sessions (1985), cited above, and fellow deep ecologist, Andrew McLaughlin:

Most industrial people live lives that are fairly similar in structure, despite surface differences... At a sensory level, urban life is relentlessly distracting. The hum of machines and vehicles and the sounds of radios and televisions surrounds city life. Silence is lost. People live by clocks and by schedules set by work and amusement. Daily life is a celebration of material consumption, as people are surrounded by things to be purchased and exotic foods to be consumed (McLaughlin, 1993: 70-71).

TOWARDS DISMANTLEMENT

The emplacement/displacement dualism provides neither an accurate nor adequate account of how we encounter places and how we dwell within place. Interconnectivities are backgrounded and denied, nuances and complexities dissolved, and the value and worth of some experiences (and those doing the experiencing) sidestepped. This offers a simplistic and, in some cases, privileged account of ‘placement’ that masks, suppresses and potentially demonises other possible accounts. It is an account that requires dismantling not only as a means of unearthing other richer conceptions of self in relation to place, but also as a means of addressing, in part, allegations of parochial and fascist tendencies aimed at aspects of place discourse.

Geographer Doreen Massey argues that there exists within aspects of place discourse a focus on local belonging; a “notion of dichotomy between authentically local on the one hand and foreign/intruder on the other” (Massey, 2006: 35).^v Manifestations of this may be as malignant as *Germanenturm* – the notion used by the Nazis as the basis for what they saw as their race (and place) determined supremacy (Schama, 1996). Undercutting such reactionary senses of place and identity requires, in part, a dismantling of the dualistic structures that inform them.

Dismantling a dualism, or attempting to envisage how we describe being in place beyond the framework of the emplacement/displacement dualism is a complex affair. As Plumwood (1993) argues, it not only requires awareness of the existence of a specific dualism, but requires attentive and critical reflection upon the structure of dualism that underpins western culture. Dualisms do not exist in isolation to each other, but act to reinforce and validate each other in a complex web of perpetuation. To attempt to change dualistic assumptions requires not only awareness of a particular dualism it also requires a radical restructuring of the foundations of reason and rationality (Plumwood, 2002).

In relation to specific dualisms, Plumwood argues that any attempt to dismantle a dualism and bring value to the inferiorised side to the pole must be a critical and qualifying one (Plumwood, 1993: 63). She states that restructuring individual dualisms is not simply a matter of recognising and valuing difference, but of recognising and valuing the complex interactions of both continuity and difference: "What will now be valued positively will not be the original, polarised characteristics, but liberatory analogues obtained by transcending the false choices created by the polarised understandings of dualism" (Plumwood, 1993: 66).

As such, a move towards dismantling the emplacement/displacement dualism involves a reconsideration of the five features of dualism outlined above with reference to Plumwood's (1993) own observations on moving beyond the dualistic framework. Dismantling the emplacement/displacement dualism includes:

- Recognising the contribution of that which has been backgrounded, and acknowledging the dependency of the privileged pole on the inferiorised pole (Plumwood, 1993: 60). This includes acknowledging the interdependencies that exist between emplacement and displacement and recognising that the experience of displacement is a contributor to the experience of emplacement.
- Affirming continuity, including re-conceiving the poles in a more integrated way, reclaiming the denied overlap and breaking the false choice between the two (Plumwood, 1993: 60). There is nothing *absolutely* unique that separates the experience of displacement from that of emplacement. There may be aspects of each that differ from the other but there are also aspects that both types of experiences may share; there is some common ground between the two that is the continuity of experience. It is not simply a matter of either experiencing emplacement or experiencing displacement.
- Reviewing the identities of both poles through the rediscovery of a language and a narrative for the inferiorized side (Plumwood, 1993: 60). In other words, letting the experience of displacement speak on its own terms, and allowing understandings of what it means to experience both emplacement and displacement be changed by this.
- Recognising the inferiorized disjunct as a centre of value on its own account, and one worthy of respect (Plumwood, 1993: 60). It involves recognising that the experience

of displacement carries its own centres of meaning and value; its own centres worthy of consideration and respect.

- Recognising the complexity and diversity of the 'other nations,' which have been homogenised and marginalised in homologising accounts of the inferiorized pole (Plumwood, 1993:60). This includes recognising that the experience of displacement is nuanced, complex and diverse, and is as a situational affair as experiences of emplacement.

Any move to restructure the emplacement/displacement dualism cannot be conceived as a straightforward dissemination of rights or worth to the experience of displacement; it is not a simple acknowledgement and valuing of difference that sees the characteristics of displacement moved from the inferiorized to the prioritised pole. It is not a matter of saying, for example, that we used to value place-based artisanship and now we will recognise the value of mass production. To not critique or qualify the nature of the characteristics of each ensures the retention of dualistic features, not a move beyond them.

Nor is it a matter of moving towards a conception for which there is nothing profoundly different about the two experiences; melding the two without critiquing and quantifying the characteristics ascribed to the two and perhaps attempting to do away with the two notions of 'placement' (or even 'place') as identifiers with contested and disrupted meanings. In rendering experiences of emplacement and displacement meaningless, there is no basis for dialogue within the dualism; no possibility for dialogue surrounding 'placement' and the importance of self in relation to place. By attempting to discard something that is so deeply embedded within western culture – attempting to 'put it out of critiques' way – the possibility for change is effectively subdued. Experiences and identities emerging in the perceived void will remain dependent upon the dualistic configuration of the originating poles.

Neither is it a move to affirm the experience of displacement as in some way warranting more attention, as more meaningful and of greater value than the experience of emplacement. For example, a move that involves the reversal of the poles and in which experiences of displacement are actively promoted and pursued is obviously problematic and fails to recognise that many of the characteristics ascribed to the experience of displacement are caught up within the powerlessness of the subordinate. Switching the poles will not necessarily resolve the existing power imbalance.

All of these approaches explicitly or implicitly act to maintain the structure of dualism (Plumwood, 1993) and offer no pathway towards some other understanding of 'placement' and the ontological nature of place. As with the male/female dualism, it is not enough to argue that men and women are simply different without also looking at how and why they are conceived as different. It is not enough to say men and women are in fact the same – perhaps attempting to render meaningless the notion of 'gender' – without considering the dynamics that underpin this apparent equity. It is also not adequate to ascribe power and privilege to women and relegate men to the subaltern.

As Plumwood observes, in moving to dismantle a dualism we aim to avoid the Swamp of Affirmation, the Desert of Difference, and the Cavern of Reversal (1993: 61).

We aim, instead, to use our familiarity within the emplacement/displacement dualism to find our footing on a Pathway of Relationality; in moving to dismantle this dualism we are stepping out within the interrelatedness of the two. This involves a reconfiguration of emplacement as a fluxing ontology that includes characteristics of displacement, and a reconfiguration of displacement as a fluxing ontology that includes characteristics of emplacement. It is also a shift in the characteristics of each, as in dialogue with each other displacement and emplacement create something unique, more integrated and situationally nuanced.

Although far from unproblematic, experiences of displacement can be acknowledged as capable contributors within libratory and subversive practise; they can be recognised as part and parcel of meaningful and embodied experience. However, it is important not to under estimate of the horror experienced by many displaced people and beings. As previously discussed the aim of dismantling the emplacement/displacement dualism is not to blindly reverse the poles and value one in conjunction or above the other; rather what is of significance here is the multiplicity apparent within displacement experiences, a multiplicity within which displaced people and beings are recognised as active participants within encountering and countering this displacement. This may manifest, for example, in the emergence of unique music or the evolution of a new species. Hence, powerlessness is not the only character of the displacement experience though it is important to recognise that there may be aspects of displacement that are too enmeshed within powerlessness to be valued. Thus, while rejecting some aspects, it is also possible to move beyond the powerlessness without also rejecting the entirety of the experience of displacement. People and other beings finding themselves caught up within experiences of displacement may do well in some ways by unearthing more lateral forms of emplacement –forms of emplacement not recognised in the emplacement pole. The displaced may become emplaced without necessarily doing way with or abandoning all within their experience of displacement, but through staking their own claim at ‘placement’. Experiences of emplacement may then be informed and enriched in dialogue these other forms of emplacement.

Our comprehension of the experience of emplacement shifts, and becomes more nuanced and less confining. It emerges not as a panacea but as a fluxing, highly nuanced, situationally varied and relationally dependent mode of dwelling; a mode of being that inhabits *the shadow places as interconnected within the home place*. An example of how such an understanding of emplacement may be narrated, I believe, can be found in Plumwood’s personal account of *being prey* in Kakadu National Park (1996).

BEING PREY

For many Australians, Kakadu feels like a familiar place. Even if we have never physically been there, images of water lilies, still reflective backwaters and Aboriginal rock art inhabit our homes – on posters, and in calendars, books and TV travel shows. A visit to the place will likely unsettle the sanctity so often portrayed in these images. Yet, for many, meeting with some of the particularities of Kakadu – being bitten by mosquitoes and sweltering in the heat – may be incidental and transitory experiences that are rapidly dispersed with a dab of lotion and the steady current of an air conditioner.

On her second day of exploration in Kakadu, Plumwood's feelings of familiarity with those aspects of the place that emerge through photography and tourism began to shift as she took a canoe trip and met with other aspects of the place: "The drizzle turned to a warm rain within a few hours, and the magic was lost" (Plumwood, 1996: 32). In this shift, her experience of the place rapidly became more complex. Her sense of place became inhabited with an increasing recognition of unfamiliarity. The crocodile began to assert itself, not only as a "symbol of the power and integrity of this place and the incredible richness of its aquatic habitats" (Plumwood, 1996: 32), but as a manifestation of other possibilities. The place began to speak of other more crocodilian particularities, including ones significantly less dispensable than hot weather and a bite of a mosquito.

As well as experiencing physical disorientation, Plumwood describes herself taking *refuge* from the rain, making *haste* over lunch, and *resisting* a defeated return to her trailer. While still holding onto the possibility of a return to a sense of familiarity—through an exploration of the channel that she visited the previous day – Plumwood's sense of place becomes dominated by an unfamiliarity; in sensing herself as being watched she experiences herself as outside the insideness of the place. The meaningfulness she had experienced within her sense of Kakadu through activism and wilderness imaginary now appears to her as somewhat misplaced, and she describes the place now as 'puzzling'. She goes on to describe herself as feeling as though she is "standing in one of the most dangerous places on earth" (Plumwood, 1996: 33). She feels herself as a large rock balanced precariously on a small rock – the small rock being the place itself, shrunk in meaning to an insubstantial base upon which to comprehend herself. A sense of relief at the thought of a return to her trailer, dominates her thoughts.

As Plumwood moves towards the possibility of the familiarity of her trailer home, the unexpected happens as a crocodile launches an attack on her canoe. In her scramble to climb a tree and to position herself as outside the crocodile's realm, she attempts to 'push' the crocodile back into its place within a pre-colonial Kakadu: "'Go away!' (We're British here)" (Plumwood, 1996: 34). Being an outsider now offers not fear and uncertainty, but the familiar cultural pose of the colonial self setting itself apart from and against the colonised. Perhaps surprisingly both for the reader and Plumwood herself, within these initial stages of the attack Plumwood finds herself at home within

the familiar terrain of the coloniser/colonised dualism. Moments later she again glimpses “the world ... ‘from the outside’, as a world no longer my own, an unrecognizable bleak landscape composed of raw necessity, indifferent to my life or death” (Plumwood, 1996: 34). Yet, this time, there is nothing familiar for her here – no ontological home turf – just a rapid and radical unsettling of self, inhabiting a previously unconceivable place.

After her bloodied escape from the crocodile, her sense of outsidership continues in her struggle to reach help. It includes “shouting for mercy from the sky, apologizing to the angry crocodile, *repenting to this place for my intrusion*” (Plumwood, 1996: 35, emphasis added).

Perhaps due to her strength of spirit, following her escape from the crocodile Plumwood quickly regains some kind of footing. She finds herself approaching familiar ground again, not just the physicality of the ranger station, but her own bush experience through use of her navigation skills. Though, once rescued it is her ongoing sense of being an outsider that spurs her to speak out against a hunt to kill the crocodile: “I was the intruder, and no good purpose could be served by random revenge” (Plumwood, 1996: 36).

As Plumwood heals and returns home – both physically and ontologically – a sense of outsidership and alienation continues to manifest. It fuels her ongoing gratitude for life: “The gift of gratitude came from the searing flash of near-death knowledge, a glimpse ‘from the outside’ of the alien, incomprehensible world in which the narrative of self has ended” (Plumwood, 1996: 36). It also dominates her response to the media coverage of her story, as she describes much coverage as giving “alien meaning” both to her sense of self and her experience (Plumwood, 1996: 37), particularly the masculinist portrayal of the attack as a sadistic rape and of the bush as no place for a woman. Plumwood was ‘out of place’ within these tellings; the meanings of which were not lost on her, but diligently exclude other possible, more feminist portrayals.

Yet, Plumwood also finds herself at home within some terrain that is very familiar for her – that of the human/nature dualism. She writes “The thought, ‘This can’t be happening to me, I’m a human being. I am more than just food!’ was one component of my terminal incredulity. It was a shocking reduction, from complex human being to a mere piece of meat” (Plumwood, 1996: 39). It is here that we encounter not only Plumwood’s honesty in her account of her experiences, as such thoughts – like those previously described in relation to her sense of ‘Britishness’ – appear to fly in the face of much of her theoretical work. We also encounter just how complex senses of place are. The delineation between emplacement and displacement is not only a radical oversimplification of how we are within place, it is also a distortion of the complexities of the comings and goings that occur as self within place. As Plumwood (2008) recounts, dualisms – including that of human/nature – strip place of meaning and significance; they remove us from place. Yet as deeply embedded cultural components they also frame how we feel at home within place. Plumwood, as culturally enmeshed, finds familiarity in a moment of deep ontological crisis within the coloniser/colonised and

human/nature dualisms, yet knows only too well what potentially restrictive and disenfranchising places these dualisms maintain.^{vi}

CONCLUSION

Plumwood's sense of place in relation to the crocodile attack is a sense of place that continually slips between and through many of Relph's descriptions of insiderness and outsiderness. It is a sense of place that is situationally nuanced and highly complex. The profound displacement she experiences is tangled up within significant and meaningful experiences of emplacement – be this emplacement within images and imaginings, knowledge, cultural imperatives and/or the materiality of place. Following the attack, Plumwood's return home remains entwined with her experiences of displacement associated with the crocodile attack, not in opposition to it. For Plumwood these are not two distinct kinds of experiences and neither are they different by degree. Rather they move in and out of each other, and through and beneath each other. As such, for Plumwood displacement is not a homologous singular experience, but one which, like emplacement, carries within it a flux of richness and texture.

To be emplaced is not just about feeling good. To be emplaced is to experience the multiplicity of place – the wonder and the joy, and the hurt and the horror – and to dwell, as Plumwood does, within this multiplicity.

Acknowledging experiences of displacement as radically entwined within experiences of emplacement calls for a restructuring and a rehousing of how and what these experiences are understood to be. It calls for a revisioning of Relph's (1976) notions of insiderness and outsiderness to include a complexity overlooked by their linear representation; a revisioning that can openly accommodate the multiplicity of experiencing and how differing types of experience entwine, interconnect, mix and meld. Such a revisioning is likely to include the incorporation and prioritisation of issues of power and justice within emerging articulations of 'placement' as it is powerlessness and injustice that render experiences of displacement problematic rather than these experiences in and of themselves. Importantly such a revisioning must include issues of power and justice pertaining to both the human and the more-than-human.

Moving to dismantle the emplacement/displacement dualism is, in effect a homecoming. It is part of a move towards reparation of so much that western culture has backgrounded and denied, and it is part of a move towards recognising of the multiplicity and complexity of place, and self in relation to place. Importantly, this is not a homecoming steeped in nostalgia; it is not about yearning for a home in a different time and space. This is a homecoming of where we are now within the ups and downs of life, where we lose footing and gain it again in complex and nuanced ways within the shifting terrain of place. In this we are always, already coming home:

I danced that year. I was dancing the deer-hoof music, the Water Shaking. I saw him standing with some Blue Clay people and Shadow and Ekwerkwe. After the dance I went over there. He greeted me, saying, 'That's a good middle name that

came to you, Woman Coming Home. Do you have to go away again so that it can go on being true?’

‘No,’ I said, ‘I’m learning to be my name.’ (Le Guin, 1986: 367)

A challenge for place discourse is to recognise the continuity and differences between experiences of emplacement and displacement – to give, on their own terms, experiences of displacement a home within the emplacement of self.

ENDNOTES

ⁱA number of versions of ‘Being Prey’ have been published including Plumwood (1996; 1999).

ⁱⁱFor example, the hyperseparation of the emplaced and emplacing wild from the displaced and displacing built within environmental ethics (Booth, 2008; Light, 2001).

ⁱⁱⁱThis example from Shepard (1977) is cited by deep ecologists Bill Devall and George Sessions (1985) as an example of a deep sense of place.

^{iv}Plumwood (1993; 2002) asserts that deep ecology, in failing to adequately address cultural dualism, remains mired within dualistic suppositions. Others have developed Plumwood’s observations regarding the self/other dualism perceived within deep ecology (see Warren, 1999; Diehm, 2002; 2003).

^vSee also Mathews Humphery (2000), Peter Van Wyck (1997) and Michael Zimmerman (2000), who make similar claims with regard to deep ecological conceptions of place and emplacement.

^{vi}Rod Giblett (2009) is surprised at what he describes as Plumwood’s reproduction not only of the “patriarchal, western moralisation of the wet-landscape, but also its dualisms, spatial metaphysics and poetics of land and water, good and bad, white and black, heaven and hell, above and below” (2009: 31). In this he fails to recognise that Plumwood’s account of her crocodile attack is an embodied phenomenological narrative, one within which it is not possible to apply theory and simply throw off cultural structures without first moving to carefully and thoughtfully critic and qualify them. The void resulting from such an attempt will only be filled by the same structure though perhaps in a new form, and we would be left floundering within Plumwood’s *Desert of Difference* (1993). Giblett’s attempt to do away with the cultural baggage that he sees as entwined in our relationship with crocodiles results in what is perhaps a novel though largely unconvincing and meaningless account of human and crocodile relations. He has attempted to throw out part of that which is required to start a dialogue for a new understanding of the relationship.

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