Gender, Nature and the Oblivion of Being:  
The Outlines of a Heideggerian-Ecofeminist Philosophy

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Introduction

This paper outlines the fundamental aspects of a Heideggerian-ecofeminist philosophy. It aims to be suggestive rather than definitive regarding the form and function of such a philosophy and will, consequently, be somewhat partial and incomplete. It is intended to highlight the enormous potential of such a hybrid philosophy. To this end it will provide a brief account of the philosophy of the later Heidegger, with particular emphasis on his analysis of technology and his account of the Greek concept of truth as aletheia, or unconcealment. It will also focus on Heidegger’s account of the connection between the Greek concept of nature as physis and his own ontology of Being, “letting-be” as the appropriate attitudinal stance to existence, and the bearing of all the above on contemporary ecological concerns.

A major problem that faces any attempt to construct a Heideggerian-ecofeminism concerns Heidegger’s reticence regarding gender issues, which stem from his view that Dasein, human beings, are ontologically prior to any sexual difference. This article acknowledges the lacuna in Heidegger’s thought regarding gender, but argues that one can educ a coherent and credible account of gender difference and oppression from Heidegger’s later philosophy without distortion.
The later Heidegger, as he develops his critique of technological modernity, moves beyond the position put forward in *Being and Time*. In light of his later account of the Gestell, the Enframing, we can see why this was the case. *Being and Time*, to use the later Heidegger’s terminology, is an “enframed” work. It is an account of the fundamental categories of existence as perceived from within the Enframing and, as such, its account of Dasein and its relation to Being is necessarily skewed. However, *Being and Time* can still be of considerable use if it is read against itself, in light of later Heideggerian philosophy, as an enframed work. And it is the key contention of this paper that when we do so, such a re-reading leads us to a Heideggerian account of gender. In other words, by retrospectively applying later Heidegger to *Being and Time*, we arrive at a new understanding of its key concepts, such as ready-to-hand and present-at-hand. These in turn lead us to a Heideggerian account of gender and nature and their intrinsic inter-connection that both captures and accords with key ecofeminist insights. To be more specific, we arrive at an ontologically grounded theory that can be used to provide an account of patriarchy in terms of Dasein’s ontological homelessness and which in turn points the way to a more positive relationship towards Being and physis/nature. In an attempt to demonstrate the compatibility of Heidegger-based ecofeminism with pre-existing forms of ecofeminist philosophy, this paper will refer throughout to other ecofeminist philosophers, in particular Susan Griffin and Vandana Shiva. This is not to suggest that these two philosophers are in any way representative of the entirety of ecofeminist philosophy. Rather, this paper holds that Griffin and Shiva are especially useful for elucidating the numerous resonances between ecofeminist philosophy and the philosophy of the later Heidegger. They are also both exemplars of the form of anti-dualist ecofeminist philosophy that this paper endorses.

Why Does Ecofeminism Need Heidegger?

For all the efforts that have been made to articulate an ecofeminist philosophy, most attempts tend to draw on existing social relations and forms of oppression for their analysis, and go no further. In addition, they tend to be focused on particular issues, such as in vitro fertilization treatment or new biotechnologies, or else are more concerned with providing general critiques of the modern world, than with attempting to construct fully developed alternative worldviews to put in its place. Much ecofeminist theory directs the focus of its ire on capitalist-
patriarchal metaphysics, critiquing it for forcing an untrue picture of reality onto nature, the sole purpose of which is to justify its continued exploitation by the capitalist-patriarchal elite of the Western world. Insofar as ecofeminists look for a historico-philosophical root of this metaphysical malaise they tend, as Trish Glazebrook observes, towards one of two positions.

The first position identifies Greek philosophy, in particular its value dualisms, as the ideological source of the oppression of both women and nature. (Glazebrook cites Rosemary Ruether and Susan Griffin as adherents to this view.) The second position identifies modern science, particularly as articulated by Descartes and Bacon, as the origin of the logic of domination that permeates western rationality. (Glazebrook cites Vandana Shiva and Carolyn Merchant as proponents of this view.) Heidegger, Glazebrook argues, can accommodate both these perspectives without contradiction. His philosophy is able to reconcile the theory of Greek origins with that of the modern science origins by locating the genesis and development of modern science in classical Greek thought. To be more specific, in the philosophy of Aristotle.

Aristotle, he argues, by understanding nature as consisting of two principles, matter and form, led to the belief that an entity was no more than formed matter: that is to say, passive matter upon which a form has been impressed. This, combined with the subjectivism ushered in by Descartes, leads to the present view of nature as resource.

Up to Descartes’s time, and even later, man was conceived as the animal rationale, as a rational living being. With this particular emphasis on the I, that is, with the “I think”, the determination of the rational and of reason now takes on a distinct priority. For thinking is the fundamental act of reason. With the cogito – sum, reason now becomes explicitly posited as the first ground of all knowledge and the guideline of the determination of the things. This is the “grounding moment” of modern science for Heidegger. Henceforth science can impose its preconception of an object onto the unyielding and plastic matter of the world. The will now imposes form.

However, this overlap between ecofeminist theory and Heideggerian philosophy, though convenient, does not by itself create a compelling case for attempting to use the latter to ground a philosophical understanding of the former. Perhaps the question of what use Heidegger can be in developing an ecofeminist philosophy is best approached negatively. In other words, what reasons might there be, from an ecofeminist perspective, for rejecting the philosophy of the later Heidegger? The first, most obvious reason stems from the fact that Heidegger’s politics were, at one point in his life, somewhat extreme. However distasteful Heidegger’s politics during his dalliance with
Nazism may be to us, I would argue there are no convincing reasons to believe that his later philosophy in any way propagates this political ideology. A second reason for rejecting Heidegger might be that his later philosophy is too opaque, vague, or theoretical to generate the kind of practical political action that ecofeminism exists to promote. Whilst one might have some sympathy with this position, it should be noted that ecofeminism has its origins in political activism. Thus the motivation to put one’s ecofeminist beliefs into practice already exists. It is rather the philosophical underpinnings and justification of such actions that are lacking, and it is these that Heideggerian philosophy can provide. A third, more significant objection, might be that Heidegger addresses neither gender nor ecology in his philosophy. Given that these two areas are the raison d’etre of ecofeminist theory, this does pose something of a problem. Having said that, though, the absence of gender-nature analysis in Heideggerian philosophy does not mean that one cannot make use of this philosophy in framing such an analysis. Indeed, it is central to my argument that one can indeed derive such an analysis from the later Heidegger in such a way that not only grounds ecofeminist theory but deepens its understanding. A theory of gender and nature may not be explicit within Heideggerian philosophy, but it can be constructed from it without doing violence to Heidegger’s own positions.

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**Heidegger on the Essence of Technology**

It is not immediately obvious how Heidegger’s writings have much bearing on the subject matter usually attended to by ecofeminist philosophers. However it will be argued here that Heidegger’s views on science and technology bear considerable similarities with the analyses of science and technology put forward by ecofeminists. Furthermore, it will be argued that Heidegger’s insights into the nature of science and technology can be used to extend and clarify ecofeminist views on these matters. Heidegger can be used to provide a more coherent and wide-ranging account of science and technology which, whilst it is not always immediately similar to pre-existing ecofeminist viewpoints, is highly compatible with the ecofeminist outlook.

Heidegger’s account of science and technology cannot be addressed without first reaching an understanding of his concept of Being. For Heidegger, the key to truly understanding technology is not to study technologies themselves, the artefactual instances of modern technology, but to reflect on the essence of technology. The essence of modern technology, according to Heidegger, is not itself technological and thus is not to be found in the artefacts of technology, nor in their effects. To understand technology we must, to use Heidegger’s vocabulary, consider it not at the ontic level, the level of individual appearances, but at the ontological level, that which underlies the ontic.
Though part of the destiny of Western civilization, Heidegger views the essence of technology as outside of human control, and a potential threat to both humanity and nature.\footnote{17}

Before one can begin to unravel exactly what Heidegger believed the essence of technology to be, one must first understand his position on truth, nature, and the character of technological activity. Key to Heidegger’s perspective on technology is the concept of truth, a concept that he feels is most fully comprehended with reference to the Greek understanding of the word *aletheia*—revealing or unconcealment.\footnote{18} The manifestation of any phenomena, be it naturally or through craft, is a revealing. In bringing itself forth, or through being brought forth, phenomena reveals itself. Aletheia is therefore the area in which things reveal their truth. *Techne*, the use of crafts to bring something forth into human awareness that was not previously present, is thereby a mode of aletheia. In the bringing forth of techne something is brought out of concealment and into revealing, the realm of aletheia.\footnote{19}

A further level of meaning arising from understanding aletheia as truth is that, due to the nature of aletheia, every claim to absolute truth is an untruth. Truth, for Heidegger, is not a static but a dynamic concept. Rejecting the assumption that to provide a description of a thing that we deem “true” is to provide an account that represents a complete description of a phenomenon of fixed qualities, Heidegger argues instead that to bring something into aletheia is not the end of the process of revealing. As we bring a thing out of concealment into unconcealment, we simultaneously conceal that thing. To focus on revealing certain aspects of a thing is to turn away from other aspects.\footnote{20} Thus, within whatever truths we deem to have been revealed there always remain those which are unrevealed. Thus the truth of a thing is always a shifting, only partially understood matter.

Modern technology is also a mode of aletheia. It, like traditional techne, induces the manifestation of phenomena that were not already apparent. The key difference between the modern and historic activities lies in the nature of the inducement. Techne’s mode of revealing is a bringing-forth into unconcealment of that which was concealed. Modern technology, in contrast, is a challenging-forth. It is to demand of nature that it yield up energy in a way which may be stored, transmitted, and utilized.\footnote{21} Rather than induce nature to bring into appearance that which lay within it, but in concealment, modern technology orders that nature reveal its truths in a way that is amenable to human exploitation, that is, in a manner that conforms to that which suits the Gestell, the technological framework imposed upon nature. A thing becomes reduced to no more than its utility-potential.\footnote{22} Phenomena are still revealed but are only permitted to manifest themselves in “expedient” ways, rather than as they would.\footnote{23} They are transformed.\footnote{24} It is for this reason that Heidegger views modern technology’s mode of revealing as a challenging-forth, a setting-upon.
It is important to note here that Heidegger is not suggesting that the phenomena of nature that modern technology reveals and utilizes are, in any ontological sense, fabricated. “Man does not have control over unconcealment itself, in which at any given time the real shows itself or withdraws.” The truths of nature provided by science and technology are “genuine” truths. Their falsity lies in their claim to represent the totality of the truth of natural phenomena. As discussed above, to bring one aspect of a phenomenon into truth is to conceal other aspects. Modern technology’s nature of revealing means that phenomena only manifest themselves within the Gestell as \textit{Bestand}, standing reserves. Their other qualities remain in concealment. And it is with this perception of the world, through the technological framework as Bestand, that Heidegger locates the real danger of modern technology.

\section*{Techne, Physis, and the Ethics of Care}

Heidegger, as shown above, identifies the essence of technology as the Gestell, the “setting-upon that challenges.” Nature/reality is forced to reveal itself as the standing reserve, a resource well.

Everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately on hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering . . . Whatever stands by us in the sense of standing-reserve no longer stands over against us as object.

The ethos of the modern era is a form of radical nihilistic subjectivism. Man believes that he wills the world to be as it is, yet he too stands within the Enframing. He too is ordered to stand by, to be immediately on hand. Heidegger asks the question, “does not man himself belong even more originally than nature within the standing-reserve?” He answers, “precisely because man is challenged more originally than are the energies of nature, he is never transformed into mere standing-reserve.” The important word here is “mere.” Man is himself ordered but, as we shall see, never completely.

This understanding of Being differs radically from that of the Ancient Greeks, on Heidegger’s account. In brief, the Greeks understood truth as \textit{aletheia}, as the unconcealment that simultaneously conceals. Technology, for the Greeks, was a bringing-forth, \textit{poiesis}, rather than a challenging-forth. \textit{Poesis}, bringing- forth, is defined as that which lets “what is not yet present arrive into presencing.” Heidegger identifies two types of poesis. The first, \textit{physis}, is a bringing-forth that is unassisted. “What presences by means of \textit{physis} has the irruption belonging to bringing-forth . . . in itself.” Heidegger gives the example of a blossom coming into bloom. The second type of poesis, \textit{techne}, is a bringing-forth in which the irruption that occurs
spontaneously in nature is assisted by the craftsman or artist. “What is brought forth by the artisan or the artist . . . has the irruption belonging to bringing-forth, not in itself, but in another.”33

Poiesis, as Julian Young points out, also has a broader meaning. At the level of the specific, such as the example of the blossom coming into bloom, it is an event that takes place within nature. “At its most fundamental level, however, poiesis is the blossoming forth of nature.”34 It is the irruption into existence of the natural world. “Being as a whole reveals itself as physis, ‘nature,’ which here does not . . . mean a particular sphere of beings but rather beings as a whole, specifically in the sense of upsurge presence.”35 The presencing of the world, unlike the blooming of the blossom, is not visible and being of such greater scale, and was perceived as being tremendous and awe-inspiring. “The Greeks, then, experienced their world as brought into, and sustained in (B)eing by an overwhelmingly powerful, utterly mysterious force . . . It was, in short, a numinous world, a holy, a sacred place.”36 The Greeks thus saw the presencing of the world as a divine process, and it is this fact that, according to Heidegger, explains the Greeks’ different relations to technology.37

Given that the world itself is perceived as being a divine place, a constant gift from the gods, it follows that one’s attitude to the world and its contents will reflect this perception. Viewing the world as a place worthy of respect and conservation, the Greeks acted accordingly. This is not to say that they wrought no changes in the natural world, but that all such transformative actions were bounded by considerations of appropriate respect and conservation. Hence the emphasis on “bringing-forth” as opposed to “setting-upon” as the dominant mode of production. Hence also the classification of human productive activities within the same sphere as natural processes of growth and emergence. Rather than imposing a form upon nature, the Greek craftsman “lets” what is already immanent but concealed in the materials come forth from concealment into presence. Productive activity is a respectful assistance to nature, rather than an imposition of will. It is a matter of letting the divine origin of things complete its self-disclosure through one’s own creative activity. Thus, the essence of Greek technology, the underlying ground for its mode of world-disclosure, is the perception of the world as divine. This is why their technology was gentle and caring, as opposed to violent in the fashion of modern technology, whose essence is the Enframing.38

It has been noticed that, in contrast with Heidegger’s description of man’s relationship with nature in the Gestell, in terms of “setting-upon,” “challenging-forth,” and so on, his description of “letting-be” is
far more feminine. What Heidegger advocates with his letting-be is a way of being with entities that explicitly rejects the violence of the Gestell, and its will to order, or impose order. Heidegger redefines Dasein as “the shepherd of Being.” His philosophy offers, against the Gestell, an ethic of stewardship and care. When one dwells upon the earth, “the homeland is experienced as caring for and protecting the dweller who, in return, cares and protects, conserves it.” It is a commitment to maintenance, and a rejection of the will-to-order. Summarizing this position, Huntington states,

Human being cannot prevail over the age of the Gestell by will, but must rather twist free of the historical consequences of Western metaphysics by recovering the capacity to embrace the intrinsic beauty housed in the singularity of each and every other being.

It is here, in Heidegger’s account of dwelling and Dasein as custodian that we see the potential of his philosophy for underpinning and elaborating ecofeminist insight into the ecological problems of the modern world. The notion of reciprocal care between Dasein and nature goes to the heart of ecofeminist visions of appropriate existence. Among several ecofeminist attempts to expound an ecofeminist ethical system, one noteworthy attempt can be found in the introduction to Maria Mies and Vandana Shiva’s Ecofeminism. Here they advocate a type of partial relativism. One is not to sit in judgment on the conduct of those in other cultures, nor interfere in their affairs, unless one is compelled to do so. The only situations that merit external judgment or interference are those, to put it in Heideggerian terms, in which violence is being done. This ethics of letting-be, and its rejection of violent setting-upon, is entirely Heideggerian in tone. In short, ecofeminism and Heidegger share a similar critique of the origins of technological modernity and a common ethos in their vision of appropriate existence. The question remains, however, whether Heidegger can accommodate ecofeminism’s focus on gender and nature, and the systems of oppression of capitalism and patriarchy.

Zimmerman’s Objection and the Forgetting of Women

Michael Zimmerman contends that Heidegger’s philosophy cannot be made to serve the purposes of an ecofeminist philosophy. Zimmerman argues that Heidegger’s ontological account of Western history conceals and marginalizes the issue of sexual difference in favour of his own focus on ontological difference. Feminists, by contrast, do not seek the origins of modern technology in Greek philosophy or the history of Being, but in historically specific socio-cultural forces. Focus on the
sexual difference, rather than the ontological, enables them to locate an alternative source for the logic of domination that characterizes technological modernity. Namely, “the patriarchal domination of woman, body, and nature.”45 So, while agreeing with Heidegger that the west is governed by an aggressive drive for total control, they argue that this arose for gender-related factors, rather than ontological ones. Zimmerman argues that Heidegger’s characterization of Dasein in ontological terms, and thereby gender-neutral terms, results in him relegating issues of sexual difference to matters of metaphysics.

Zimmerman also argues that Heidegger’s hoped-for new epoch of Being will not bring about the acceptance of difference and Otherness. Rather, Heidegger’s account of the turn in Being, according to Zimmerman (following Bernstein), effectively totalizes the event of Being.46 The new clearing that will follow the demise of the Gestell will be as monolithic as its predecessor. Heidegger advocates an enforced homogeneity, albeit one in which Dasein stands in an open and positive relation to Being, rather than the celebration of plurality and diversity. World-disclosure, for Zimmerman, is a cultural paradigm. Heidegger’s turn in Being has a one-size-fits-all character. It allows one view from the clearing of Being, rather than enabling a multiplicity of overlapping local worlds.47

In summary then, if it is to be of use in grounding an ecofeminist philosophy, it must be shown that the philosophy of the later Heidegger can perform certain functions. It must be able to explain the connection between women and nature. It must be able to account for patriarchy and capitalism and the connection between them and the oppression of women and nature. Furthermore, it must be shown that Heidegger can accommodate plurality and difference. These are the necessary conditions that must be met for any putative Heideggerian-ecofeminism to be considered as such. Let us turn then to the first condition, an account of women and nature.

Women, Nature, and Being

Heidegger argues that Dasein is claimed by Being in such a way that it opens up a site in which Being can manifest itself. Technological modernity operates with a limited notion of this, and only permits Being to presence in the uni-dimensionality of the resource. If we interpret ecofeminist accounts of women’s actions in the maintenance and propagation of life in Heideggerian terms, then we can say that the Dasein of women creates and holds open a clearing in which the Being...
of beings can presence itself in a non-violent way. In other words, a way that is not a setting-upon or a challenging-forth. We may consider three basic examples of the ways in which the Dasein of women can disclose its ek-static nature, its standing out into the truth of Being. First, this nature is apparent in what Ariel Salleh calls women’s “holding” activities. The term *holding* describes the way in which women, within the household or locality, attempt to minimize conflict, sustain children in safety, maintain the interconnectedness of a family, and so on. Salleh states that, “holding practice is the quintessential work of resisting entropy.” Through holding, the activities that sustain human life and community, women maintain a site where Being can be, ontically. For Being to presence, there must be Dasein to hold open the clearing. By sustaining (social) life, women maintain the ontic conditions necessary for this to occur.

Second, women can be connected to Being through reproduction. By bearing children and nurturing them, women are clearly connected to Being in the manner just considered. However, on another level, women, by bringing forth life within themselves, are connected to Being through poesis. In bringing a child to term, women are connected poetically to Being as physis. A mother, like the peasant who sows the field, places life “in the keeping of the forces of growth and watches over its increase.” As with the Greeks, she both enables and bears witness to the “upsurgent presencing” of nature. In this way, she has insight into and connection with other modes of physis, such as are present in the cycles of the natural world.

Third, in those parts of the world where agriculture is still the main form of industry, women often play an invisible role. They perform a range of activities that are necessary for the continued well-being of both the family and the land upon which they depend. Because this labour is not “productive” in the sense that it does not generate surplus value, it is often ignored, despite the fact that it is necessary for the maintenance of the conditions of existence which in turn enable humans to engage in those activities that are deemed to be productive by the rationale of the Gestell. In gathering wood, or planting and sowing, women come to bear immediate witness to the constant processes of physis and to an awareness of their dependency upon them. In short, they come to an appreciation of physis and respect it as sacred. Thus, when ecofeminists speak of Nature as a model for human activity or a source of ethical norms, on the Heideggerian-ecofeminist account put forward in this paper, it is to be understood that they are in fact speaking of Being, albeit Being as understood in its presencing as physis. Thus women stand in proximity to Being through physis.
At this point one may well ask how it is that women stand in this proximity. Is woman’s connection to physis by virtue of her bodily existence, or is it a socialized awareness? To ask the question in this way threatens to return us to the hoary feminist debates of essentialism versus socialization. Understood ontically, Dasein is neither. Dasein, in its nature, is a being-in-the-world. That is to say, it is embodied. For Dasein, mind and body are one. It is an embodied mind and a minded body. Ontologically, by virtue of its ek-static nature, Dasein always stands out into the truth of Being whether Dasein is aware of this fact or not. Thus, whether Dasein is “socialized” or “biologized” into an awareness of its relation to Being is of secondary relevance, given the primary fact that this relation is ontologically prior. In this way a Heideggerian-ecofeminist account of women’s connection to Being avoids the charge of recreating value dualisms caused by enshrining women’s perspectives as a positive over the negative of the male outlook, in reverse of their normal standing. Rather, women’s standpoint is given due respect, but it is not held to be superior simply by virtue of it belonging to a woman. Rather its superiority to the standard masculine view is held to be the fact that women are aware of their fundamental connection to Being, while men are not. The key point here is that men and women, by virtue of their ek-static nature, both have this connection to Being. Men, however, suffer from the Oblivion of Being.

The Enframing and Alterity

However well a Heideggerian account of the ontological character of women affirms and underpins cherished ecofeminist conceptions of women’s connection to and place within Nature, the question still remains concerning the apparent absence of patriarchy and capitalism in Heidegger’s account of the Enframing (Gestell). Or, to be more specific, how can Heidegger, if at all, account for the way in which women are marginalized and mistreated under the capitalist-patriarchal system that, for most ecofeminist theories, characterizes modernity? The obvious answer would be to argue that under the Gestell both humanity and entities are viewed as pure resource, and thus treated as such, rather than as beings-in-themselves. The exploitation of women, consequently, stems from their location within the standing-reserve of the Enframing. And in turn their liberation and appreciation as beings in their own right depends upon humanity’s ability to overcome the Enframing and open themselves to a new turning in Being. However the problem with this response is its gender neutrality. From
Heidegger’s account of the Enframing, one gets the impression of a sort of “homogeneity” of oppression. Modernity’s logic of domination treats all as resources regardless, one is led to conclude, of race, creed, and most importantly for the purposes of this discussion, gender. Within the Gestell, *e pluribus unum*. Such a view would run contrary to the tenets of ecofeminist philosophy given that it is founded on the belief that while all are, to an extent, oppressed within modernity, not all are oppressed equally. Furthermore, Heidegger’s account of the effects of the Enframing signal fails to link the oppression of women and the oppression of nature. Consequently, from an ecofeminist perspective, Heidegger’s analysis of modernity’s system of oppression and exploitation is, whilst generally sound, far too general and insufficiently gender-specific to provide a truly accurate account. However, I believe that Heidegger’s account of the Gestell can yield a sufficiently gender-sensitive approach. To do so, however, it must be modified from the version provided in the *Question concerning technology*. And, to do this, we must return to the account of technology given in *Being and Time*. More specifically, we must return to the famous example of the hammer.

First, a word or two by way of explanation. This sudden turn towards the contents of *Being and Time* might well appear somewhat odd given that this article has thus far declared itself to be solely interested in the philosophy of the later Heidegger, that is to say, the philosophy that he produced after his famous “turn” in the 1930s. *Being and Time* is most definitely a pre-*Kehre* work and, therefore, should be, on the face of it, excluded from this thesis. To use the philosophy of Heidegger found in *Being and Time* to elucidate aspects of his account of the Enframing would appear to require the assertion that there is some sort of continuity of approach between early and late Heideggerian philosophy. This, once again, being an interpretation that this paper has most explicitly ruled out. Heidegger’s pre-*Kehre* philosophy has been excluded thus far because Heidegger does not begin to seriously address the question of Being as a topic in its own right before his “turn.” Prior to this point, and particularly in *Being and Time*, Dasein still has prominence. Being, as it were, exists for Dasein, rather than vice-versa as in the post-*Kehre* work. In this respect, to use the terminology of the later Heidegger retrospectively, *Being and Time* is a profoundly modernist work. That is to say, it is contained within the worldview of the Enframing. In this work Heidegger analyses the ontological categories of human existence within a conceptual scheme skewed by the Gestell. And it is this fact that gives it its present utility with regards to the issue of gender-sensitivity.
In *Being and Time* Heidegger discusses the ways in which the Being of beings manifests itself to Dasein. Dasein’s way of being-in-the-world is such that objects do not appear to Dasein as objects in themselves. Rather they appear from a perspective of instrumental utility. Dasein experiences them as tools, actual or potential, which it can employ in the pursuit of its objectives, whatever they may be. As Heidegger puts it, they reveal themselves as “equipment.” He states,

Equipment can genuinely show itself only in dealings cut to its own measure (hammering with a hammer, for example); but in such dealings an entity of this kind is not grasped thematically as an occurring Thing, nor is the equipment-structure known as such even in the using. The hammering does not simply have knowledge about the hammer’s character as equipment, but it has appropriated this equipment in a way which could not possibly be more suitable. In dealings such as this, where something is put to use, our concern subordinates itself to the “in-order-to” which is constitutive for the equipment we are employing at the time; the less we stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is—as equipment. The hammering itself uncovers the specific “manipulability” of the hammer. The kind of Being which equipment possesses—in which it manifests itself in its own right—we call “readiness-to-hand.”

In other words, the primary mode of world-disclosure is that in which the world is revealed as an equipmental totality, or as Heidegger will later characterize it, as standing-reserve. The hammer never appears as a Thing, that is, as a being-in-itself, but rather as a being-in-order-to. The “in-order-to” here refers to the intentions of its users rather than any inherent tendency within the entity itself. Thus the being-in-order-to is better understood as a being-for-us. That is to say, it stands before us as pure resource, eminently suited to being manipulated to human (male) ends.

In addition to, and derivative from, the disclosure of beings as ready-to-hand, beings can also be disclosed as “Things”, that is to say, as objects. In this mode of world-disclosure, beings appear as present-at-hand. Rather than being an invisible component of an underlying equipmental totality, as present-at-hand, an entity reveals itself in a non-purely instrumental manner. In doing so it detaches itself from its near invisible place in the work-world and stands before us as an object of contemplation, something that may be considered in (hypothetical) isolation. It is this kind of disclosure of beings that Heidegger takes to be typical of the physical sciences.

If knowing is to be possible as a way of determining the nature of the present-at-hand by observing it, then there must first be a deficiency in our having-to-do with world concernfully. When the concern holds back from
any kind of producing, manipulating, and the like, it puts itself into what is now the sole remaining mode of Being-in (the world), the mode of just tarrying alongside . . . This kind of Being towards the world is one which lets us encounter entities within-the-world purely in the way they look, just that on the basis of this kind of Being, and as a mode of it, looking explicitly at what we encounter is possible . . . such looking-at enters the mode of dwelling autonomously alongside entities within-the-world. In this kind of “dwelling” as a holding-oneself-back from any manipulation or utilization, the perception of the present-at-hand is consummated.60

Heidegger here clearly views the enframed view of entities as standing reserve to be the originary, and foundational, mode of Being.61 To view entities as individuals in their own right, with their own characteristics, is to step back from the primary instrumental mode of Being-in-the-world. Regardless of its ontologically derivative status, this division between present-at-hand and ready-to-hand is of key importance in understanding the status of women within technological modernity.

On the one hand, we have entities viewed as ready-to-hand, that is to say, that appear to us as pure resource (Bestand). On the other hand (in Being and Time) we have entities understood as present-at-hand, that is, as objects. At first glance, it may seem as if these categories apply only to non-human beings.62 Ready-to-hand and present-at-hand would seem to be descriptions of either pieces of equipment, like the hammer, or materials, that upon which the equipment operates, or that which is taken up in the construction of the equipment (wood and metal, in the case of the hammer) and vanishes into it the more it is used. However, given that we are re-reading Being and Time in the light of Heidegger’s later philosophy, we may interpret these categories as applying to human as well as non-human entities. In “The Question concerning Technology” Heidegger states that, “Only to the extent that man for his part is already challenged to exploit the energies of nature can this revealing that orders happen.” He then asks, “If man is challenged, ordered, to do this, then does not man himself belong even more originally than nature within the standing-reserve?”63 Heidegger’s answer is most significant for the purposes of this discussion. He replies, “precisely because man is challenged more originally than are the energies of nature, he is never transformed into mere standing reserve.”64

Heidegger’s response that humanity, by providing the site in which being can bring itself to presencing, stands out at all times into the presence of being, should be familiar to us. What is of novel import here is Heidegger’s precise phrasing of the answer to his own question of whether humanity is itself transformed into pure resource with the Enframing. His reply is that humanity is never transformed into “mere
standing-reserve.” In other words, humanity is revealed as resource just as non-human objects are, just as “the wood is a forest of timber, the mountain a quarry of rock.” The difference being that humans never vanish completely into the standing-reserve, in the way that a non-human object does, given Dasein’s special relationship with the presencing of Being. Dasein is always the site of Being’s self-disclosure, whether humanity recalls this fact or forgets it. In this way, and in this way only, does humanity differ from other entities within the Gestell. And if Heidegger’s call for us to rediscover our powers and responsibilities as world-disclosers fails, and humanity utterly forgets its ek-static nature, then, in practice, there would be little to distinguish, at an ontic level, between human and non-human.

So, to return to the question of the entities included in Heidegger’s early categories of ready-to-hand and present-at-hand, it would appear that it applies to both humans and non-humans alike. Thus humans, within the Enframing, will appear as either ready-to-hand or present-at-hand. The relevance of this to the status of women in modernity is as follows. Men, particularly the working classes, on a Heideggerian account have come to be ready-to-hand. Within modernity’s productionist metaphysics, they function as productive units. This is both their destining and what gives them their status and purpose. From this view, the history of labour-relations and class struggle is the record of gradual transformation of male workers into more or less efficient (i.e., productive) components of the standing reserve. The more effective they are, the less visible within the technological system they become. In the same way that the stone and wood that make up a bridge vanish into its functioning totality the more they fulfill their role, so too do the individual workers vanish into the totality of technological production. Women, as feminists often point out, initially laboured under the Engelian notion that their admittance into the field of productive labour would usher in an era in which they would share equal status with their male counterparts. The reality has been somewhat different. In many cases women are excluded from areas recognized as being productive labour. Their own labour, outside the standard conceptions of the modern work-world, is devalued or ignored. Where women are admitted into the work-world, they are rarely completely accepted and assimilated. In Heideggerian terms, women tend to appear as present-at-hand.

Let us return now to Heidegger’s earlier argument concerning the nihilism of the technological age, the rise to ascendancy of the “will to will.” For an entity to appear as present-at-hand, that is to say, as an object, one requires the presence of Dasein, a willing subject, that stands over and against the entity now appearing as an isolated object.
When man, investigating, observing, pursues nature as an area of his own conceiving, he has already been claimed by a way of revealing that challenges him to approach nature as an object of research, until even the object disappears into the objectlessness of standing-reserve.\textsuperscript{70}

Man, ordered himself by the Gestell into a part of the standing-reserve, at the same time imposed his will to order onto nature. In extending the Enframing, man transforms himself ever more into the “objectlessness” of pure resource, whilst at the same time reaffirming his nature as a willing subject, the being-that-wills-the-world. Man enframes, and is thus himself enframed. Woman, on the other hand, is somewhat different. Where “fortunate” enough to be assimilated into the work-world, she approximates to the status of pure resource. She is ready-to-hand. Where she cannot, or will not, merge into the equipmental totality, she appears as an object. She is present-at-hand. At no point is she ever the subject, the being-that-wills-the-world.\textsuperscript{71}

There is also a considerable difference between the way a woman appears as present-at-hand, an object, and the way in which entities in the world appear as present-at-hand in the physical sciences. In the latter case, the entity-as-object is an object for contemplation and scrutiny, and eventual description in mathematical terms. In the former case, that of women, the situation is very different. Consider Heidegger’s account in \textit{Being and Time} of how it is that Dasein (which in this case we can understand as referring to men) comes to consider an entity, such as hammer, as being present-at-hand rather than ready-to-hand.

When we concern ourselves with something, the entities which are most closely ready-to-hand may be met as something unusable, not properly adapted for the use we have decided upon. The tool turns out to be damaged, or the material unsuitable . . . When its unusability is discovered, equipment becomes conspicuous.\textsuperscript{72}

Women, I will suggest, are viewed within modernity, and its capitalistic-patriarchal value system, as being “unsuitable material” for productive labour, and thereby for becoming pure resource, let alone a willing subject. The term “present-at-hand,” when taken in its social rather than scientific context, is a term of denigration.

Heidegger continues,

When we notice what is un-ready-to-hand . . . it reveals itself as something just present-at-hand and no more, which cannot be budged without the thing that is missing . . . In our dealings with the world of our concern, the un-ready-to-hand can be encountered not only in the sense of that which is unusable or simply missing, but as something un-ready-to-hand which is \textit{not} missing at all and \textit{not} unusable, but which “stands in the way” of our concern.\textsuperscript{73}
In other words, that which cannot be assimilated into the equipmental totality, can appear not as currently unusable, but as useless.

The modes of conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy all have the function of bringing to the fore the characteristic of presence-at-hand in what is ready-to-hand. But the ready-to-hand is not thereby just observed and stared at as something present-at-hand; the presence-at-hand that makes itself known is still bound up in the readiness-to-hand of equipment. Such equipment still does not veil itself in the guise of mere Things. It becomes “equipment” in the sense of something which one would like to shove out of the way. 74

Those excluded (where excluded denotes “not used”) from production relations appear as present-at-hand. This means that they appear as mere things that have dropped out of the equipmental totality. By not conforming, that is, vanishing into the standing-reserve, they reappear as objects, opposed to the willing subject, with no use-value. 75

Although no longer a part of the standing reserve, they are still of matter to the Gestell for they appear as a hindrance to the will-to-order. The question that follows from this account is this: why it is that women stand outside the reserve well? The answer, on a Heideggerian account, is Being.

Heidegger, as Glazebrook points out, views the Gestell’s logic of production as a “logic of domination.” 76 Its monolithic interpretation of all entities as resources, its absolutization of one productionist horizon of disclosure, its totalizing hegemony, and its nihilistic affirmation of the will-to-will, are all, on ecofeminist account, attributes of patriarchy. The Enframing’s logic of domination is thus a phallo-centric logic. “In grounding knowledge on the Cartesian subject” Glazebrook argues, it results that, “being is not the underlying substratum upon which thought moves, but rather the thinking subject underlies all experience and is the absolute fundament on the basis of which things receive their thinghood, that is, objectivity.” 77 The will is active, and the willing subject determines all values. The will imposes itself on passive nature, passive matter, and orders it to present itself in accordance with productionist metaphysics as standing reserve. The active will and productive activity are the two positives of technological modernity. That which is not of the will, or stands against it, is passive and thereby without intrinsic value. Action that takes place outside the rigorously defined categories of “productive” labour, is by definition non-productive labour, or simply non-labour, and thereby of little or no value. This dichotomy of active versus passive, that which has value versus that which does not, corresponds to the value dualisms that ecofeminists have identified as perpetuating forms of patriarchal oppression. 78 Active is male, which has value. Passive is female, which
does not. As we have seen, ecofeminists would argue that that which in
the logic of modernity appears as passive, that is to say women and
nature, is in fact active in the sense of letting things be. It is activity that
enables the forces of physis/Being, understood here as Nature, to
manifest themselves, as opposed to the setting upon that compels nature
to reveal itself as resource. Thus we find, on a Heideggerian-
ecofeminist account, two competing accounts of truth and praxis here.
Given their gendered nature, we may classify them as the masculine
principle (Gestell) and the feminine principle (physis).

By this point, it may be assumed that we have a fairly comprehensive
notion of what it is that is referred to by the term, “the Enframing.” Far
less obvious is what we are to understand by the “feminine principle” of
which ecofeminists speak. If we were to follow an essentialist
ecofeminist definition of the “feminine,” given such theories’
naturalistic inclinations, one might well arrive at the conclusion that the
feminine principle denotes a set of distinct and hypothetically definable
features belonging to women by virtue of their biological nature alone.
In other words, properties of women exclusively. If, on the other hand,
we sought an anti-dualistic ecofeminist definition, given that this is the
form of ecofeminism that this paper has chosen to focus on in the
construction of a Heideggerian-ecofeminism, then we would arrive at
the following definition of the feminine. Namely, that the feminine
principle is all that is excluded by the Enframing. And what is excluded
includes not just extant properties of beings in the world, but the entire
potential for novelty in reality.\textsuperscript{79} Thus the feminine, as the “other” can
never be exhaustively defined and known. It is a principle rather than a
property. In short, that which anti-dualistic ecofeminists value and seek
to restore to consciousness is, on a Heideggerian-ecofeminist account,
the remembrance of Being itself.\textsuperscript{80} Thus women appear as the bearers
of alterity, the excluded “other” of beings not seen within the strictures
of the Gestell. They carry an awareness of the plentitude of Being
outside the present clearing.\textsuperscript{81}

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**Metaphysics, the Abyss and the Construction of Masculinity**

Let us turn away for the moment from the feminine principle and
consider what we have tentatively described as the masculine principle,
that is, the Enframing. The Enframing is an ontological condition, the
coming to presence of a particular epoch of Being that was heralded by
the death of metaphysics. As such, it is not something that is dependent
on the will of man. Patriarchy and capitalism, on the other hand, are
certain historically specific responses to the Enframing. In Heideggerian terms, they are metaphysical responses to an ontological sending. As the Gestell is spread ever further through the processes of globalization, it seems as if the present capitalist-patriarchal character is a necessary feature of the Enframing. However, this to forget that the present manifestation of the Enframing is a “destining of the West.” That is to say that, in its origins at least, the Gestell as capitalist-patriarchy is culturally specific. Capitalism and patriarchy, on a Heideggerian-ecofeminist account, are to be understood as ontic structures, specific cultural responses to the ontological condition of the Enframing. This is best understood as a spirit of technological nihilism, a condition in which man totally subjectivizes nature and imposes his will upon it. Given the vagaries of societal structures in different historical periods, it follows that the Gestell-driven expression of the will-to-power, namely the world as resource well, could be expressed in different ways. It is thus a historically contingent fact that, in the West, its expression was mediated by an elite who had the capacity to mobilize technological production to their own ends. This understanding of the relationship between patriarchy and the Enframing underpins ecofeminism’s claim that all forms of oppression (racism, patriarchy, capitalism, etc.) are linked. Following Heidegger, all are to be understood as ontic responses to the ontological condition of the Enframing. However, given the importance of patriarchy for ecofeminist critique, let us now consider how the Gestell came to manifest itself with its present patriarchal character.

We have seen how, within the Enframing, entities are only able to reveal themselves in a one-dimensional manner. Himself challenged, as he challenges forth the world, man too is revealed primarily as resource. Or as Herbert Marcuse puts it, as one-dimensional man. Man’s one-dimensionality within modernity stems from the fact that he defines himself purely in terms of his use-value, his productive capacity. As Steve Garlick puts it,

> Truth is now thought of in terms of the certainty of representation grounded in the autonomous human subject . . . set in place and ordered to exhibit itself as part of a projection that Heidegger refers to as the “world picture”, human being is hereby given its distinctively modern and paradoxical position as potential controller of a system in which it is itself produced.

In this way, the Gestell not only orders man’s world, it also grounds his understanding of what it is to be a man. When beings become enframed, their being is regulated and secured according to the framework of modern technology. “The concept of masculinity, as a product of modern technological thinking, allows men to be standardized and equated with one another as human resources, which
can thus be endlessly swapped about."87 By ordering forth humans in
gendered terms, it stabilizes the human subject, which in turn grounds
the world.88 Gender hierarchies, such as patriarchy, provide a means by
which to stabilize the ground of disclosure by preventing difference
from undermining order. Thus both economic and social activity were
framed in a way that was oriented towards the production of order
itself.

Modern technology, then, “is a movement towards the absence of
difference.”89 It is a way to ground the groundlessness of modern
existence. For, to ground itself, the Gestell must remove all that
threatens to reveal its claim to world-exclusivity to be empty. Within
the Gestell, man believes himself to be the ground of all that is, the
subject-that-wills-the-world. Thus, in his own enframed understanding
of Being, he constructs a world precariously balanced upon the Abyss
that threatens it constantly. The nothingness, here understood as
absence, the void, hedges his projected world about and constantly
threatens to overtake it and subject both it and him to annihilation, to
become no-thing. This is the source of the profound ontological
insecurity, which so characterizes Heidegger’s account of Dasein’s
existence in Being and Time. As Garlick puts it, “this anxiety over the
groundlessness of modern existence is self-perpetuating because radical
ontological insecurity results from revealing the world as merely
‘standing reserve’.”90 The apparent fragility of productionist
metaphysics makes man anxious, so he further reinforces the Gestell by
asserting it more forcefully, over a greater area. But the Abyss still
threatens.91 Hence his ontological insecurity, which leads him to re-
assert the Gestell, thereby reaffirming his actual being, and in turn
simultaneously reinforcing the ontological condition that makes him
insecure. It is a vicious circle.92

Heidegger’s Neglect of the Ontic

It may be objected that Heidegger’s suggestions of new ways of being
with technology and beings-in-the-world tends to focus overly on the
ontological rather than the ontic level. Now, one might well allow
Heidegger his point that the character of the ontic stems from the
ontological by virtue of the fact that the way beings are in the world
depends upon the present mode of the presencing of Being, and still
maintain that the ontic is neglected. For example, it may well be the
case that technological artefacts are subordinate to the mode of world-
disclosure that dominates in modernity, namely the Enframing. This
would follow from Heidegger’s point that the type of technological practice that takes place in a culture stems from the way that that culture perceives the world and the beings within it. However, this does not mean that the technological practice of a culture, that is to say its activity at the ontic level, has no bearing on the ontological level of world-disclosure.

Heidegger’s privileging of the ontological over the ontic overlooks the enormous physically transformative powers of modern technology. It is not simply the case that the Enframing presents the world as if it were nothing but resources, and then technological practice then follows in like manner in the treatment of beings. Rather technology now has the power to reconfigure beings in the world such that they physically rather than conceptually become resources. Heidegger, in his discussion of the way minerals are taken up and transformed physically into energy, suggests that he is aware of the power of technology to literally transform at the ontic level. He states,

the earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit . . . Agriculture is now the mechanized food industry. Air is now set upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, ore to yield uranium . . . uranium is set upon to yield atomic energy . . .

However he cannot be diverted from his ontological focus. Given that the danger posed by the present environmental crisis is a threat at the purely ontic level, though its origins may well lie in an ontological mode of disclosure, Heidegger’s unwillingness to engage with technology and its transformative powers at the ontic level constitutes a significant lacuna in his theory. As Ricard Wolin points out, “were Being deprived of the richness and variety proper to organic life, it would become faceless and mute, devoid of purpose, ontologically impoverished to an extreme.” In this fashion, the ontological needs the ontic.

It is at this point that ecofeminism can radically bolster and extend Heidegger’s analysis. Ecofeminist writings are replete with examples of technologies’ destructive effects on women and the natural world. A particularly relevant example of this is given by Shiva in her account of the so-called Green Revolution in India. Her analysis of the transformation of Indian agriculture with the introduction of western biotechnology is most telling. The power of modern technology, on Shiva’s account, lies in its abilities to make the metaphysical projections of the Gestell actual. Through the intervention of technology in nature, the metaphysical horizon of disclosure that characterizes the era of the Enframing is imposed on nature and ceases to be a conceptual schema. Nature literally becomes as the Gestell
would have it. She writes, “The Green Revolution was based on the assumption that technology is a superior substitute for nature, and hence a means of producing growth, unconstrained by nature’s limits.”95 Nature was set upon to operate in a “productive” mechanistic way. “The masculinist breeding strategy of the green revolution was a strategy of breeding out the feminine principle by the destruction of the self-producing character and genetic diversity of seeds.”96 In other words, nature was transformed physically in order to eradicate difference. The self-generative powers of nature as physis represent a challenge to the technological will that insists that all movement and change originate from the willing subject. Entities (seeds) were transformed by science in such a way that they could only manifest themselves as pure resource.97 However, as Shiva points out, “the superimposition of a new order does not necessarily take place perfectly and smoothly.”98 The consequence here is that “the soils of India are dying.”99 The destruction of ecological integrity through the transformation of agriculture into a more “productive” process has resulted in fields where nothing can grow. In other words, man’s ontic destruction of nature physically prevents any future mode of Being. Where there are no beings, Being cannot presence.

Conclusion

This paper has sketched in rudimentary form the outlines of a Heideggerian-ecofeminist philosophy. Such a philosophy can offer an analysis of the technological essence of modernity and of the origins and operations of capitalist-patriarchy that supports and extends pre-existing ecofeminist critiques. It holds that capitalism and patriarchy are historically specific metaphysical responses to the ontological condition of the Enframing, a condition in which the world is set upon to reveal itself as pure resource. By re-reading Being and Time in light of the later Heidegger’s account of the essence of technology, we can see how women appear as present-to-hand in the era of the Gestell. That is to say, they stand out against the will of the male subject by failing to vanish into the objectlessness of the standing reserve. In this way, they appear to the male as a mere object that stands as an obstacle against the exercise of their will, to be pushed aside and kept out of view. The reason for women’s inability to be harmoniously absorbed into the resource-well stems from their awareness of their ontological connection to Being as physis/nature, a connection that men have lost from awareness. The recovery of this awareness is essential to the possibility of a turn in Being, and the ushering in of a new epoch in
which Dasein acts as a shepherd of Being as opposed to struggling for mastery. In addition to drawing attention to the ontological roots of the modern oppression of women and nature, and the liberatory potential of Being, understood here as the feminine principle, a Heideggerian-ecofeminist philosophy also focuses upon the danger posed at the ontic level by the technological transformation of the earth and the damage that results. Such a philosophy compels one not only to reflect on the ontological structure of oppression, but also to act in defence of physis/nature.

References


**Notes**

1 Given the nature of this journal, the article will assume a passing acquaintance with ecofeminist theory on the part of the reader. For those seeking to know more, Nancy Howell’s “Ecofeminism: What one needs to know” or the chapter on ecofeminism in Rosemarie Putnam Tong’s “Feminist thought: A more comprehensive introduction,” are as good a place to start as any.

2 A word or two on what this paper means by “anti-dualist” ecofeminism is clearly in order. Anti-dualist ecofeminism is, broadly construed, any ecofeminism that takes the position that the primary conceptual position underpinning patriarchal modernity is based upon the separation of existence into value-laden dualisms: conceptual dyads that are both exclusive and antagonistic. Furthermore, it is the privileging of one part of the pair and the denigrating of the other that underlies and perpetuates oppressive relations of domination, be it those concerning gender, class or nature. Anti-dualist ecofeminism chooses to reject the conceptual schisms involved in dualistic thought and the practices they support. In doing so they simultaneously reject essentializing analyses of gender that treat terms such as “nature” or “woman” as if they were some underlying and unchanging metaphysical quality on the grounds that such analyses, however well intentioned, tend to reinforce, rather than expose and undermine, value dualisms (e.g., feminist positions that define women as biologically “closer to nature” than men).

3 Francoise d’Eaubonne being a notable exception to this rule (d’Eaubonne 1999).

4 This is not to suggest that elements of a possible future state are not suggested.

5 Ruether 1975; Griffin 1978.

This view of the will as active and form-giving, and matter as passive and pliable is clearly gendered.

The details of the debate over the alleged Nazi over/undertones of Heidegger’s philosophy are far too lengthy to go into here. I believe that Heidegger’s philosophy, especially his later philosophy which is the main focus of the paper, in no way supports or propagates Nazi ideology, although this view is by no means uncontroversial. The good starting point for information concerning the debate over the political character of Heideggerian philosophy is Wolin (1993). For a detailed and even-handed account of Heidegger’s political engagement with the forces of fascism, see Sluga (1993).


It is not my intention in this paper to suggest that Heidegger’s later philosophy is the one, sole possible philosophical grounding for ecofeminism. I do however incline towards the view that much that is central to the works of the later Heidegger is implicitly presupposed in the work of many ecofeminist philosophers, although one is in no way committed to sharing this view by accepting the thesis put forward in this paper. The strongest claims that I wish to make in this paper are, firstly, that Heidegger’s later philosophy provides an ontology (understood here in the broadest possible sense) that is highly compatible with much ecofeminist philosophy. And secondly, that this ontology is one that ecofeminists should endorse because it offers them a means by which to extend and deepen their insights in ways that they should find acceptable. (I am indebted to Dr. Seiriol Morgan for his clarificatory comments regarding these points.)

As stated earlier, I use the term “ecofeminism” in this paper to denote an anti-dualist account of ecofeminism. The anti-dualist variety of ecofeminist philosophy includes both materialist and cultural forms of ecofeminism. In this I follow Carlassare’s argument that materialist and cultural forms of ecofeminism are not mutually exclusive. Rather “materialist strategies for social change are implicated in cultural ecofeminism, and cultural or idealist strategies for social change are implicated in socialist ecofeminism” (Carlassare 2000: 99). Coined by Ynestra King to describe Susan Griffin’s ecofeminist philosophy, anti-dualist ecofeminism is opposed to any oppressive dualistic dichotomies, e.g. reason/culture, passive/active and thus stands in opposition to any forms of ecofeminist essentialism, such as that of Mary Daly, in that they serve to reinforce such dualisms (King 1989: 28, Daly 1979).

Heidegger states, “Technology is not equivalent to the essence of technology. When we are seeking the essence of ‘tree’, we have to become aware that what pervades every tree, as tree, is not itself a tree that can be encountered among all the other trees” (Heidegger 1993: 311)

Macquarrie and Robinson provide the following helpful definition, “Ontological inquiry is concerned primarily with Being; ontical inquiry is concerned primarily with
entities and the facts about them” (Heidegger 1962:31). In other words, the ontic concerns the properties of existent things, whilst the ontological concerns what it is for the thing to be, or exist.

17 To say that technology is outside of human control does not entail that technological development is autonomous. Rather it is meant to suggest that the essence of technology is beyond human mastery.


19 Pattison 2000: 50.


22 Mitcham 1994: 52.

23 Pattison 2000: 54.

24 Alderman comments, “A being thus technologically uncovered stands in a position to be disposed of in a productive process, and the beings of technology are nothing more than this passive stance of waiting to be used by man” (Alderman 1978: 47).


29 Heidegger 1993: 323.

30 Heidegger here uses the word “man” to refer to human beings in general, although, as Garlick suggests, a more literal reading may be appropriate much of the time (Garlick 2003: 179).


33 Heidegger 1993: 317.

34 Young 2002: 41.

35 Heidegger 1993: 126.

36 Young 2002: 41.

37 For more information on the relations between nature and spirituality in the later Heidegger see Swer: 2008.

38 It has been pointed out by some commentators that the Ancient Greeks also wreaked considerable damage upon their environment, and thus that Heidegger’s account of their “gentleness” is somewhat idealistic (Ihde 1993: 112). However, as
Young observes, “it matters not at all to Heidegger’s essential purposes whether his ‘Greeks’ are actual or fictional…” (Young 2002: 43). Rather, the example of the Greeks serves as a means of contrast, a counterpoint to the contemporary mode of technological existence against which its violent character becomes readily apparent. It also gives us a suggestion of what a non-technological mode of existence might resemble. Insofar as it fulfils this function, the historical veracity of Heidegger’s account of the Greeks is of secondary importance. (I must stress however that this does not mean that employing a Heideggerian-ecofeminist philosophy of the sort outlined in this paper commits one to the view that contemporary concerns regarding environmental devastation are of secondary importance.)

39 Stambaugh translates Gestell as “framework”. Her analysis of the term is most revealing:

“‘Gestell’ in the sense in which Hedeigger uses it does not belong to common language. In German, ‘Berg’ means a mountain, ‘Gebirge’ means a chain or group of mountains. In the same way ‘Gestell’ is the unity of all the activities in which the verb ‘stellen’ figures: vorstellen (represent, think), stellen (place, put, set), entstellen (disfigure), nachstellen (to be after someone, pursue him stealthily), sicherstellen (to make certain of something) (Heidegger 1969: 14).

40 Heidegger 1993: 234.

“Dasein” is Heidegger’s term for human being, “da” meaning “there” and “sein” meaning “being”. By using this term to refer to humans Heidegger draws our attention to what he takes to be Dasein’s essential nature, that it provides the “there” in which Being can be. Humans, for Heidegger, are ek-sistent beings, that is to say beings who “stand out” into the presencing of Being. Heidegger writes that, “man occurs essentially in such a way that he is the “there”, that is, the clearing of Being” (Heidegger 1993: 229). Within the Enframing, humanity forgets that its ordering of nature, as it manifests itself as pure resource, is ordained by Being itself rather than imposed on nature by the human will. It is not the ability to exercise the will that makes a person free, according to Heidegger. Humanity, of all the beings that exist upon the earth, have the ability to witness the presencing of Being, that is to say, the way in which a world holds forth. It is in this unique ability that humanity’s essential nature can be grasped. Heidegger states that, “that essential space of man’s essential being receives the dimension that unites it to something beyond itself solely from out of the conjoining relation that is the way in which the safekeeping of Being itself is given to belong to the essence of man as the one who is needed and used by Being” (Heidegger 1977: 39). Humanity in no way determines when and how Being manifests itself as a horizon of disclosure. However Being cannot “world” without a human Dasein to provide the space in which it can do so. In this way Being both uses and needs humanity. Thus the essence of an epoch of Being and the essence of humanity are linked. A human’s “essence is to be the one who waits, the one who attends upon the coming to presence of Being in that in thinking he guards it” (Heidegger 1977: 42). Humanity, in essence, is the “shepherd of Being” (Heidegger 1993: 234).

41 Young 2000: 366.

42 Huntington 2001: 33.

43 Mies & Shiva 1993.
44 It should be noted once again that the term “ecofeminism” is used throughout this paper to refer to the anti-dualist variety of ecofeminism.

45 Zimmerman 1990: 269.

46 See Bernstein 1988.

47 Dreyfus and Spinosa’s make a similar claim about the totalizing nature of epochs of Being. They argue, however, that this position stems from Heidegger’s “middle period” and that in his later philosophy he moved towards the view of a new era of Being ushering in “a plurality of local worlds” (Dreyfus & Spinosa 1997: 173).

48 Salleh 1997: 144.

49 That is to say, by maintaining existence and social life.


One may feel that I am stretching Heidegger’s account of physis/Being beyond its original intention by linking it to women’s experience of childbirth. However, I argue that Heidegger is explicit in linking birth to Being. He states. “Birth and death take their essence from the realm of disclosiveness and concealment”, namely from the self-revealing flux of aletheia, the truth of Being (Heidegger 1998: 60).

51 Young 2002: 41.

52 It is of fundamental importance that one recognize that this is not an argument for essentialism. All humans, as Dasein, “essentially” have an ek-static nature. Reproduction is one way in which some women may become aware of their ek-static nature.

53 A good example of this is provided by Shiva’s ecofeminist philosophy, which she defines as “Feminism as ecology, and ecology as the revival of Prakriti” (Shiva 1989: 7). The concept of “Prakriti” is decidedly ontological in a Heideggerian sense. It is said to be, “the living force that supports life”, “a living and creative process”, “the source of all life” (Shiva 1989: xvii-7).

54 Griffin, poetically, goes to the very heart of all this, saying

“We dealt with hunger. We dealt with cold. We were the ones who held things together… We were the ones who, after working all day, made the meals… We made sure everybody ate… We were the ones who watched the wearing down and the daily mending and did what had to be done with the lost. We were the ones who knew what it all meant. Each breath. The cost. The years. We knew the limits… And what had to be done. We knew the length of caring… We felt the children come to life in our bodies… Day after day we kept things going… We were the ones who held things together” (Griffin 1978: 188-189).

Throughout this paper I take the view that Griffin’s philosophy is not essentialist in the sense of holding that there are biological connections between women and nature, as it is so often taken to be (for example, by Stabile, amongst others) (Stabile 1994). Rather I support Tong’s suggestion that Griffin is best understood as holding that there are ontological connections between women and nature (Tong 1998: 257).
Simon James draws out the significant but generally overlooked role of embodiment in the philosophy of the later Heidegger. Far from being a point of solely academic interest, James points out that overcoming dualistic, mind/body conceptions of human beings has important implications for overcoming the era of the Enframing. He asks, “If unsustainable practices are bodily as well as mental, might the comportment which could bring about sustainability be, to a certain extent, a bodily comportment, not just an exclusively mental understanding of the world, but a way of acting as an embodied being?” (James 2002: 4).

The term “oblivion”, in Heidegger’s usage, means forgetfulness or disregard. It is the “failing-to-remember-that-conceals”.

Heidegger still appears to hold this view in his later account of the nature of scientific knowledge provided in “Modern science, metaphysics and mathematics.” Here he argues that science reduces all entities to objects (Heidegger 1993: 303). He later abandons this view of science in favour of the argument that science operates as the herald of technology, or in other words, that science is intrinsically technological.

Griffin evokes the violence that inevitably follows from this depiction of entities as human resources,

“Separation. Tearing away. Breaking… the weed… from the flower, the metal from the mountain, uranium from the metal, plutonium from uranium, the electron from the atom, the atom splitting, energy from matter, the womb, spirit, from her body, from matter, cataclysm, splitting…” (Griffin 1978: 98).

Pattison defines “destining” as follows,

“‘Destining’ translates the German term Geschick, which has the twofold meaning of ‘destiny’ and ‘suitability’ or ‘capacity’ – and Heidegger intends both of these meanings to be heard in his use of the word. ‘Destining’ is therefore not simply a destiny or fate imposed on the world from outside, but suggests a self-adaptation on the part of Being to the way the world is, making its self-giving and self-disclosure
suitable to the capacities of those who receive it. It is therefore a two-way process” (Pattison 2000: 3).

67 Heidegger would doubtless find contemporary talk of transferable skills and flexible labour to be the culmination of the transformation of human labour into pure resource. No longer is one even a separate class within the technological work-world, e.g. a joiner, a typesetter, but a ubiquitous “worker”.

68 Vandana Shiva makes this same point quite succinctly, stating that with the rise of patriarchy “man was separated from nature, and the creativity involved in processes of regeneration was denied. Creativity became the monopoly of men, who were considered to be engaged in “production”, while women were engaged in mere “reproduction” or “procreation” which, rather than being treated as renewable production, was looked on as non-production” (Shiva 1994: 128).

69 The way in which this takes place will be explained further in the subsequent section.

70 Heidegger 1993: 324.

71 Salleh states that women in modernity, “like nature… are readily available and disposable; and like nature they have no subjectivity to speak of” (Salleh 1997: 94).


74 Heidegger 1962: 104.

75 This corresponds to a point Salleh makes about women within modernity being defined as deficient entities. She writes,

“Eurocentric (i.e. modernist) cultures are arranged discursively around what has standing (A) and does not (notA). Such a logic gives value to A expressed by the value of 1. NotA is merely defined by relation to A, having no identity of its own, and thus 0 value.” Man, being “productive”, is 1. Woman, by contrast, is “only 0, a hole, a zero. She is thus defined negatively as a lack” (Salleh 1997: 35-36).

76 Glazebrook 2001: 225.

77 Glazebrook 2001: 228.

78 Warren states that, “In a patriarchal conceptual framework, higher status is attributed to what is male-gender identified than to what is female-gender identified. This alleged higher status is then used to ‘justify’ the power-over power and privilege of men and the subordination of women” (Warren 1993: 17).

79 Thus men can be connected to the feminine principle as well as women, and conversely women may, like men, remain within the Gestell, outside the feminine principle.

80 Albeit understood by them as physis/Nature. As an example let us turn again to Shiva’s ecofeminist philosophy with its understanding of Nature as Prakriti:
“Nature as Prakriti is inherently active, a powerful, productive force in the dialectic of creation, renewal and sustenance of life… Prakriti is worshipped as Aditi, the primordial vastness, the inexhaustible, the source of abundance. She is worshipped as Adi Shakti, the primordial power. All the forms of nature and life in nature are the forms, the children, of the Mother of Nature who is nature itself born of the creative play of her thought… The will-to-become-many… is her creative impulse and through this impulse, she creates the diversity of living forms in nature. The common yet multiple life of mountains, trees, rivers, animals is an expression of the diversity Prakriti gives rise to. The creative force and the created world are not separate and distinct, nor is the created world uniform, static and fragmented. It is dynamic, diverse and inter-related… Prakriti lives in every stone or tree, pool, fruit or animal, and is identified with them (Shiva 1989: 38-39).

The similarities between Shiva’s account of Prakriti/Nature and Heidegger’s account of Being and Physis should be obvious.

81 On the suppression of Being/the feminine principle Shiva writes,

“Activity, productivity, creativity which were associated with the feminine principle are expropriated as qualities of nature and women, and transformed into the exclusive properties of man. Nature and women are turned into passive objects, to be used and exploited for the uncontrolled and uncontrollable desires of alienated man” (Shiva 1989: 6) However this division is by no means necessary. “Ontologically, there is no divide between man and nature, or between man and woman, because life in all its forms arises from the feminine principle” (Shiva 1989: 40). “The feminine principle is not exclusively embodied in women, but is the principle of activity and creativity in nature, women and men. One cannot really distinguish the masculine from the feminine, person from nature… Though distinct, they remain inseparable in dialectic unity, as two aspects of one being” (Shiva 1989: 52). In this way the recovery of the feminine principle has significance for both genders. It is a feminine, rather than a female principle, and thus includes men. “The recovery of the feminine principle is a response to multiple dominations and deprivations not just of women, but also of nature and non-western cultures. It stands for ecological recovery and nature’s liberation, for women’s liberation and the liberation of men who, in dominating nature and women, have sacrificed their own human-ness… It is a recovery in nature, woman and man of creative forms of being and perceiving” (Shiva 1989: 53).

82 We see here the influence of Spengler in Heidegger’s notion of distinctive world-cultures, each with their own epochal characteristics. See, for instance, Spengler 2002: 90-104.

83 This brings to mind Hans Jonas’s point that technology radicalizes the will-to-will, in that it gives that elite the power to make the world into the way that they perceive it.

84 The following analysis is adapted from Steve Garlick’s account of the role of the Gestell in establishing heterosexual norms and regularizing sexual activity (Garlick 2003).


86 Garlick 2003: 162.
Garlick 2003: 162.

Botha supports this point, saying that in the Enframing “human being is no longer Dasein as an open possibility, but rather a grounded actuality, a fixed identity” (Botha 2003: 161).

Garlick 2003: 166.

On this point Griffin states that,

“The mind that invents a delusion of power over Nature in order to feel safe is afraid of fear itself. And the more this mind learns to rely on delusion, the less tolerance this mind has for any betrayal of that delusion… It has begun to identify not only its own survival, but its own existence with culture. The mind believes that it exists because what it thinks is true. Therefore to contradict delusion is to threaten the mind’s very existence. And the ideas, words, numbers, concepts have become more real to this mind than material reality” (Griffin 1989: 13).

Heidegger states, “man, precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself and postures as the lord of the earth. In this way the illusion comes to prevail that everything man encounters exists only insofar as it is his construct. This illusion gives rise in turn to one final delusion: it seems as though man everywhere and always encounters only himself” (Heidegger 1993: 332).


Shiva 1991: 15.

Shiva 1989: 121.

Shiva states that, “the new biotechnologies are the latest tools for transforming what is simultaneously a ‘means of production’ and a ‘product’ into mere ‘raw material’” (Shiva 1994: 133).


Shiva 1989: 140.